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Governmental financial resilience under austerity in Austria, England and Italy: how 
do local governments cope with financial shocks? 
 
Abstract 
The recent economic and fiscal crises provide an opportunity for learning lessons of general 
and practical relevance into how governments face shocks affecting their financial conditions. 
This article draws on the resilience concept to investigate the organizational capacities that are 
deployed and/or built by local governments (LGs) to respond to such shocks, looking at their 
combinations and interactions with environmental conditions. The paper presents the results of 
a multiple-case analysis of 12 European LGs across Austria, Italy and England. The analysis 
allows to highlight and operationalize different patterns of financial resilience, i.e. self-
regulation, constrained or reactive adaptation, contented or powerless fatalism, that are the 
result of the interaction and development over time of different internal and external 
dimensions. 
 
Introduction  
Governments throughout the world have been challenged by the recent economic and fiscal 
crises. An increasing number of contributions have explored governmental responses to what 
has become commonly referred to as ‘the crisis’ (Kickert 2012a, 2012b, 2013; Lodge and Hood 
2012; Peters 2011; Peters et al. 2011; Pollitt 2010), often focusing on austerity, decline and 
cutback management (Kickert 2012a; Posner and Blöndal 2012; Raudla et al. 2013). 
Surprisingly fewer studies deal with the long-term strategic and managerial consequences of 
such phenomena for public organizations (Bozeman 2010; Pandey 2010; Pollitt 2010) or the 
processes and capacities which allow them to respond to crises. Along these lines, calls have 
emerged to develop crisis research, with attention to the skills and capacities required to cope 
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with crises (Boin and Lodge 2016). This article responds to this scholarly call and practical 
need by drawing on the concept of resilience. Looking at Local Governments (LGs), it explores 
the multiple facets of governmental financial resilience, i.e. governments’ ability to anticipate, 
absorb and react to shocks affecting their finances over time. In doing so, the paper identifies 
the internal and external dimensions and capacities that shape governmental financial 
resilience, and sheds light on how their interaction gives rise to different resilience patterns.  
In order to capture the organizational processes and capacities behind governmental responses 
to the crisis, 12 case studies across Austria, Italy and England are analysed. The country settings 
represent different administrative traditions (Meyer and Hammerschmid 2010; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2011) and different financial vulnerabilities (see Lodge and Hood 2012), providing 
evidence that, if some processes and dynamics may be specific to the country settings or 
dependent on environmental conditions, at the same time similar resilience patterns can be 
identified across countries, depending on how external conditions and internal capacities 
intertwine over time. Though the study is placed in the context of a financial crisis and its 
aftermath, the aim of the paper is not to look at country-level, or specific, responses to the 
crisis. Rather, the variety of cases and countries under analysis allows to highlight and 
operationalize patterns of behaviors of more general relevance to public management and 
resilience literature.  
The article is structured as follows. The next section provides a review of the current literature 
on financial and organizational responses to shocks. Section three discusses resilience and 
highlights the purpose and main research questions of the paper. The fourth section specifies 
the methods. The results are presented in the fifth and sixth sections, with the former focusing 
on the emerging analytical framework and dimensions of resilience, and the latter on the 
patterns of resilience emerging from the analysis. Section seven discusses the findings, and the 
final section draws the conclusions and implications for research and practice. 
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Responding to financial shocks and crises: adopting a resilience perspective 
Responding to shocks 
The recent crisis has brought about a resurgence of interest in governmental fiscal stress and 
organizational reactions to shocks. On the one hand, financial management literature has seen 
in the crisis an opportunity for reviving the long-standing academic interest in decline and 
cutback management (Hood and Wright 1981; Levine 1978, 1979; Levine and Posner 1981; 
Schick 1980). Studies of how governments tackled the crisis and austerity have been developed 
in the aftermath of the crisis (Cepiku et al. 2015; Kickert 2012a, 2012b, 2013; Overmans and 
Noordegraaf 2014; Raudla et al. 2013; Scorsone and Plerhoples 2010; West and Condrey 
2011), most of them contributing to an accumulation of contextual knowledge on fiscal and 
organizational response strategies by providing detailed and rich accounts and classifications 
of governmental reactions. Fewer studies also take an explanatory stance, looking at the role 
of organizational and/or contextual factors in affecting such reactions (Cepiku et al. 2015; 
Hendrick 2011; Jimenez 2012, 2014; Maher and Deller 2007; Overmans and Timm-Arnold 
2016), while generally paying less attention to explaining how these factors influence each 
other over time, thus leaving governments more or less vulnerable to the next crisis.  
The crisis has also revived research focusing on the effectiveness of organizational reactions 
to shocks and turbulences (e.g. Boyne 2006, Boyne and Meier 2009a, 2009b; Meier and O’ 
Toole 2009; Meier et al. 2010; O’ Toole and Meier 2010). This predominantly quantitative 
research stream highlights the role of organizational capacities, but has pointed to the need to 
further explore them in more depth and over time (Bettis and Hitt 1995; Boyne and Meier 
2009a; Meier and O’ Toole 2009), i.e. to explore how organizational capacities are not only 
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deployed to cope with shocks, but also evolve and interact with environmental conditions 
before, as well as as a consequence of such shocks.  
In light of these considerations, the recent financial crisis provides fertile ground for addressing 
these aspects and learning new lessons by adopting a long-term view (Bozeman 2010). This 
study uses the perspective offered by resilience (Davoudi et al. 2013; Suttcliffe and Vogus 
2003) to contribute to enrich and integrate the insights coming from the above streams of 
literature on how governments deal with financial shocks and disturbances over time. A 
resilience perspective not only captures organizational processes behind governmental 
responses to crises from a long-term perspective, but also draws attention to the interaction of 
external factors (environmental conditions) and internal factors (organizational dimensions) 
and illuminates their role in dealing with shocks and shaping related vulnerabilities (Shaw 
2012; van der Vegt et al. 2015).  
 
Adopting a resilience perspective 
Resilience has experienced an increasing transfer to social sciences (e.g. Davoudi et al. 2013; 
Linnenluecke 2015), though with a diversity of perspectives. The engineering perspective on 
resilience refers to the ability of an organization to reduce risks and resist, or quickly recover 
from crises (Boin and Van Eeten 2013; Holling 1973; Pickett et al.2004; Shaw 2012; Sutcliffe 
and Vogus 2003; Vickers and Kouzmin 2001). This view focuses on recovery, robustness under 
enormous stress, and the ability of bouncing back to an original state (Altintas and Royer 2009; 
Bhamra et al. 2011; Boin and McConnell 2007; Boin and Van Eeten 2013; Coutu 2002; 
Davoudi 2012; Duit 2016). Under this perspective, financial and personnel capacity, and the 
activities of an organization, are aimed to build slack that cushion and absorb shocks (Huy and 
Mintzberg 2003; Meyer 1982) to ensure survival. The evolutionary perspective on resilience 
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(Davoudi 2012; Hamel and Välikangas 2003; Pike et al. 2010) emphasizes the capacity to 
reorganize as a response to, or in anticipation of, disturbances (Martin and Sunley 2006) and 
to “keep operating even in adverse ‘worst case’ conditions and to adapt rapidly in a crisis” 
(Hood 1991, p. 14). In this view, organizations become resilient not despite of distress or 
decline, but in anticipation or because of it (Sutcliffe and Vogus 2003). Here, resilient 
organizations recognize a window of opportunity in disruptions and alter or reinvent their 
strategies (‘bounce forward‘) before circumstances force them to do so (Gunderson and 
Holling 2002; Hamel and Välikangas 2003; Holling 1986).  
The above considerations suggest that the resilience concept has different definitions, thus 
calling for further explorations aimed at identifying whether different forms of resilience can 
be observed empirically.  
Not only is resilience multifaceted, but in the literature it is also shown to be the result of a 
variety of dimensions (Darnhofer 2014; Linnenluecke 2015). Some authors focus on 
anticipation and awareness of risks (Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005; Somers, 2009; 
Linnenluecke and Griffith 2013; see also Boin et al. 2010, p. 7 and Boin and Lodge 2016, ), or 
situation awareness (McManus et al. 2007), ie, the extent to which an organization has a clear 
understanding of the environment and is able to manage key vulnerabilities. Other authors have 
highlighted the capacity to cope with unanticipated shocks once they manifest themselves 
(Wildavsky 1988, p. 88) and to quickly resume crucial functions (Boin 2016), as well as 
adaptive capacities, ie, the set of available resources and competencies that allow persistence, 
adaptation and transformation in the face of disturbances (e.g. Davoudi et al. 2013; Darnhofer 
2014; Linnenluecke and Griffith 2013; Nelson et al. 2007).  
In the above mentioned literature, resilience dimensions are discussed in broad terms, with a 
variety of meanings and mostly from a normative perspective. As such, there is no general 
agreement on how different dimensions shape resilient behaviour (Linnenluecke 2015). Indeed, 
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there have been calls in the public administration literature for empirical studies to give more 
depth on the different dimensions of resilience (Boin and Lodge 2016; Boin and Van Eeten 
2013; Duit 2016). This would also require exploring their combination and interactions over 
time, and how these affect overall resilience.  
Since the recent crisis offers the possibility of studying multiple cases of local governments 
reacting to it, it is possible to reach a finer grained view both on reactions to the crisis, and on 
resilience patterns, by looking at how resilience can be shaped by various dimensions and 
conditions. In light of these considerations, this study aims to explore the multiple facets of 
financial resilience, i.e. governments’ ability to anticipate, absorb and react to shocks affecting 
their finances over time. In doing so, and trying to address the above gaps, it is aimed at (i) 
identifying the internal and external dimensions and conditions that shape financial resilience; 
(ii) exploring if their development and interaction over time gives rise to different resilience 
patterns; (iii) better understanding how capacities evolve, i.e. are deployed and developed, and 
interact in anticipation or in reaction to crises over time.  
In addressing these aims, reliance on resilience literature allows to add new insights on the role 
of the interactions of environmental conditions and internal capacities and conditions in 
shaping such actions and reactions over time. At the same time, the paper enriches resilience 
literature by identifying and operationalizing the relevant dimensions of financial resilience. 
 
Methods 
Research design 
Given the aim of the paper mentioned above, a case study design appears to be particularly 
suited for connecting theory and empirical evidence (Yin 2009). This approach allows the 
exploration of phenomena emerging from the data, while at the same time embracing useful 
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concepts that have been discussed in prior literature (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Suddaby 2006; 
see also Denis et al. 2001; Edmondson et al. 2001; Ridder et al. 2006). 
The analysis is based on a multiple-case study of 12 European LGs across Austria, Italy and 
England. The next subsections further explain the choices regarding the context of the analysis, 
the selection of cases, and data sources and analysis.  
 
The context: European LGs 
The variety of European countries’ administrative traditions (Hesse and Sharpe 1991; Meyer 
and Hammerschmid 2010; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011), financial vulnerabilities (Lodge and 
Hood 2012) and reactions to the global financial crisis (Lodge and Hood 2012; Peters 2011) 
allows the adoption of a ‘most different/most dissimilar’ approach (Przeworski and Teune 
1970) in the selection of countries (Hesse and Sharpe 1991; Kuhlmann 2010; Wolman 2008). 
Thus, Austria was chosen as a country belonging to the Continental European administrative 
tradition and with medium financial vulnerability before and after the crisis; England as an 
example of the Anglo-Saxon tradition and of a country with low financial vulnerability before 
the crisis, and high after it; and Italy as Southern European country, and one with high financial 
vulnerability before the crisis and medium after it. The most relevant differences across the 
three countries are summarized in table 1 in the appendix, which present their main features in 
terms of administrative tradition and intergovernmental fiscal relationships.  
 
Case selection  
The case selection targeted LGs which show similar administrative responsibilities and 
functions in their respective countries. In Italy these were seats of province, in Austria seats of 
district authorities and in England single-tier and county councils (STCC). 
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A theoretical sampling approach in three steps was adopted (Patton 2015; Neumann 2006, p. 
224; Eisenhardt 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007), whereby the cases were ’chosen to fill 
theoretical categories‘ (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 537). The first step required the definition of 
possible categories of cases through the identification of key variables to be represented. Given 
the aim to explore how governments deal with shocks in their finances over time, long-term 
measures of financial performance were considered. The criteria for selection were thus 
identified in the average financial performance and its volatility over ten years (2002-2011). 
The conventional measure of governmental financial performance is the budgetary position, 
which has traditionally been expected to be kept around zero (Bretschneider and Gorr 1992; 
Rose and Smith 2011) as local governments are often legally required to balance the budget at 
the end of each year1.  
In the second step, LGs were classified in terms of their combination of average budgetary 
position and volatility. This allowed to identify main groupings of cases, representing common 
and at the same time polar combinations across the countries: low volatility and a budgetary 
position around zero, high volatility and negative or positive, as well as around-zero budgetary 
positions. Other combinations were much less likely to occur (i.e. negative or positive 
budgetary position and low volatility) and were thus not included in the analysis. 
In the third step, one case for each of these four combinations of budgetary position and related 
volatility was selected for each country, leading to a total of 12 cases. Table 2 in the appendix 
provides financial data on the selected cases, covering functions and revenue structure of LGs. 
 
                                                          
1 For Italy and Austria, that adopt a commitment based method of accounting, the budgetary position measure is 
represented by the variation in the commitment-based surplus/deficit position. For England, where a modified 
accruals basis of accounting is adopted, the measure is represented by the contribution to unallocated reserves as 
it represents the “balancing figure” between the net budget requirement on the one hand and government grants 
and locally collected taxation on the other. In England expenditure is reported net of direct income and service 
specific government grants, and is presented as balancing with the main non-specific sources of income (general 
government grants, local taxation and contributions to/from reserves). 
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Collection of data and analysis 
30 semi-structured interviews served as the cornerstone of the case study (Yin 2009), but 
triangulation of informants (up to three interviewees per case) and of data sources were relied 
upon to corroborate the collected information (Bailey 2007). Document analysis of audit and 
media reports, and in particular the analysis of the respective LG financial documents, was 
used to validate statements. The selection of the interviewees identified those individuals who 
have relevant information on financial issues. In particular, chief executive officers and 
financial directors were interviewed in all the cases (except one where the officer was not 
available). Additional interviews with service directors were conducted in 3 Italian cases and 
3 English cases. In the majority of cases (26 of 30) the interviewees had been working in the 
respective local government for more than 10 years. 
The interviews, were carried out between January 2013 and November 2015. The interviews 
lasted between 45 and 90 minutes and included open-ended questions on the financial health 
of the LG, its main financial and non-financial goals, the main risks and shocks faced by the 
LG, and how LGs had identified and responded to them.  
Given the nature of crises and subsequent limitations to ex-ante research designs, case studies 
were carried out ex-post and as such reconstruction of events could be influenced by 
interviewees’ ex-post rationalization (Patton 2015; Trochim and Donnelly 2006). Considering 
the aim of the study, ex-post rationalization is to be seen as helpful as, while in the short term 
developments may appear blurred, an ex-post approach offers clearer insights into 
multidirectional relationships (Pettigrew 1990). This may be especially true in this case, as 
resilience and its inherent dimensions are often described as becoming observable over time 
(Linnenluecke 2015) and visible under a particular set of exceptional circumstances.  
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From the interviews major themes emerged, which were discussed during debriefing sessions 
among the researchers and compared again with the empirical materials as well as with extant 
literature. This allowed the initial emergence of broad dimensions of resilience, which were 
further refined, developed and detailed into new and more focused categories through 
continuous iteration between the case data and extant literature (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007; 
Stewart 2012). First, in each country the data were coded and classified according to the broad 
themes and categories that emerged during the data collection and then compared and aligned 
across countries. These categorizations were further compared with contributions from the 
literature streams discussed above, and coding schemes were revised. The final coding 
categories and their relationships were examined to identify underlying patterns and reach the 
final conceptualization of financial resilience. Table 3 in the appendix presents the main 
variables that emerged from the analysis, their definitions and typologies, as well as how they 
were operationalized. It also shows how the interviews were coded, providing examples of 
quotations for each variable.  
 
Exploring financial resilience: dimensions and patterns  
 
Emerging dimensions of financial resilience: the framework  
This section presents the main dimensions of financial resilience emerging from the analysis 
(see also table 3 appendix). The framework that emerged from the iteration process described 
above revealed that LGs’ financial resilience, i.e., their ability to anticipate, absorb and react 
to shocks affecting their finances, was the result of the interaction of environmental conditions 
as well as organizational dimensions over time, as shown in figure 1.  
(Figure 1 here) 
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The environmental conditions, encompassing economic, institutional and socio-economic 
contextual features, emerged as relevant from the interviews in shaping perceived financial 
vulnerabilities and capacities. The most relevant external shocks quoted by the interviewees 
were all related to the crisis and its consequences.  
Two main categories of capacities for facing shocks emerged from the analysis: anticipatory 
and coping capacities. Anticipatory capacities refer to the availability of tools and capabilities 
that enable LGs to better identify and manage their vulnerabilities and to recognize potential 
financial shocks before they arise, as well as their nature, likelihood, timing, scale and potential 
impacts. In this regard, anticipatory capacity is not limited to the presence of systems in place 
to plan, control, and manage risks, but also related to situation awareness and sense-making 
(e.g. Boin et al. 2010; Lengnick-Hall and Beck 2005; Linnenluecke and Griffith 2013; 
Mcmanus et al. 2007, Somers 2009; Weick and Suttcliffe 2009). Coping capacities, which lie 
dormant in times of order and become visible in times of disruption through coping actions 
(Linnenluecke 2015), refer to resources and abilities that allow shocks to be faced and 
vulnerabilities to be managed. Coping capacities can take different forms: buffering capacities 
represent the ability to absorb the impact of a shock without changes in its structure or function; 
adapting capacities refer to the ability to implement incremental changes to extant structures 
and functions without changing underlying principles, culture, and values; transforming 
capacities, in turn, comprise the ability to implement radical changes, characterized by changes 
in the structure, function, goals and values of the organization (see also Béné et al. 2012; 
Darnhofer 2014; Davoudi et al. 2013; Folke et al. 2010).  
In general terms, vulnerability represents the exposure to shocks (Hendrick 2011; McManus 
2007). Indeed, LGs’ financial vulnerability, as perceived by organizational actors, was 
discussed as being the result of both external (e.g. dependency on grants, undiversified 
revenues) as well as internal (e.g. debt financing, reserves) sources, and thus turned out to be 
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at the interface between the environment and the organization. Rather than an objective 
measure of vulnerability, it is the perceived vulnerability, which turned out as central in 
understanding patterns of financial resilience (see also Jimenez 2012; Maher and Deller 2007, 
2011). The roles of the above dimensions are further discussed in the next section.  
 
Emerging patterns of resilience  
The interaction of the above conditions and dimensions gave rise over time to different patterns 
of financial resilience: self-regulation, constrained or reactive adaptation, contented or 
powerless fatalism. These patterns are discussed in the next sub-sections. Appendices 2-4 sum 
up, for each LG, how the environmental conditions and organizational dimensions and related 
perceived vulnerabilities combined to give rise to these patterns.  
 
Self-regulators: A1, E1, E2, I1 
The LGs in this group (A1, E1, E2 and I1), generally show low levels of financial vulnerability, 
high anticipatory capacities and comprehensive coping capacities over time (table 4 in the 
appendix). Anticipatory capacities in these LGs relied on well-developed control and planning 
systems, used for predictions and simulations, and careful creation of reserves. These features 
appeared to originate in a strong willingness of keeping potential risks under control.   
’What we have done over the last decade is to move much more towards 
a 3-year budget strategy. We started that during the good times and it 
became even more important [...] in times of austerity.’ (CEO, E1) 
 
’It is the administration’s responsibility to warn in time. […] the signals 
were there…and our financial director was the one who was planning 
with lower revenue shares – intentionally […] to have a cushion of 
about 15 per cent.’ (CEO, A1)  
 
’We try to make good predictions, […] through careful monitoring. The 
budget is […] constantly reviewed during the year.’ (CEO, I1) 
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These LGs succeeded in developing and using coping capacities which addressed their 
vulnerabilities. Although they used near-term buffering capacities to cope with the crisis, they 
also relied on adaptive and transformative ones.   
For example, I1 increased networking with external stakeholders in providing services. A1 
strengthened its self-sufficiency through re-structuring and collegiate planning, hiring people 
with professional knowledge, enhancing internal competencies, and generating alternative 
income sources. E1 had embarked on a path of “earned autonomy” and developed a “self-
sustaining financial base” which was viewed as a source of strength through the austerity 
period, while E2 realized early on that it needed to increase locally-derived fiscal income by 
attracting new businesses and new housing developments.  
These LGs aspire to maintain a status of self-sufficiency and self-regulation, avoiding being 
(too) reliant on funding or regulation from upper government levels, through continuous 
anticipation of, and active adaptation to, external shocks. This self-regulatory pattern of 
resilience is found in all the three countries (A1, E1, E2, I1), suggesting that it may be desirable 
to effectively manage environmental conditions, shocks and challenges. This is also reflected 
in generally low and stable levels of perceived vulnerability over time. 
’We […] are one of the Italian Municipalities with the lowest level of 
debt [...].’ (CFO, I1) 
 
’If you look at our balance sheet you will see that it is extremely healthy 
in terms of sitting on reserves and cash levels.’ (CFO, E1) 
 
’We have the lowest debt level in the state, probably. […] our guiding 
principle has always been to build reserves for rainy days.’ (CEO, A1) 
 
The above cases show that the willingness to maintain or enhance self-sufficiency encouraged 
a strong investment in comprehensive anticipatory capacities, adapting and transforming 
capacities, which ensure a tight control on both external and internal sources of financial 
vulnerability. Interestingly, three of four cases in this pattern share similarities in that their 
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average budgetary position remained consistently around zero over a ten-year period. 
 
Constrained adapters: E3, E4 
The LGs in this group (E3 and E4) generally showed high anticipatory capacities and 
deployment of buffering and adapting coping capacities, but witnessed an increase in perceived 
financial vulnerability over time (table 5 in the appendix). It was relatively low when the crisis 
hit, reflecting a belief that strong anticipatory capacities would make them capable of 
withstanding disturbances.  
‘We have a corporate risk approach, […] so we have a corporate risk 
register.’ (CEO, E3)  
 
‘[E4] was always well run, we always had plenty of reserves and were 
well-financed.’ (CEO & CFO, E4)  
 
This gave the crisis a prominent place in decision-making, prompting the taking of early action, 
and the deployment of coping capacities. Also, it encouraged the creation of reserves, 
subsequently used both as buffers and as levers to assist and promote change as well as absorb 
slippage. 
These LGs appear to perceive the environment (weak financial opportunities, complex social 
needs and dependence on central government funding) and the financial shocks as constraining, 
reflecting a limited ability to cope with external challenges. This left them more dependent on 
central government resources or decisions and was also reflected by a use of coping capacities 
focused more on buffering and adapting actions, including efforts on managing internal 
resources through reducing expenditure, rationalizing services, managing demand and 
increasing efficiency. 
‘[E4] is not the most affluent of areas, so we don’t have a lot in terms 
of council tax yield…we struggle in terms of inward investment and 
business [rates]’ (CEO & CFO, E4) 
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’We were not always positioned well in terms of opportunities for 
finances […] We have some very affluent and some very deprived 
areas...’ (CEO, E3) 
 
This suggests that they perceive their sources of vulnerability as being more out of their hands. 
The interviews also revealed a sense of doom regarding the uncertain nature of the future 
outlook.  
’If it goes on, what can we deliver in 2016? […] no one knows how the 
financial outlook is going to be […]. Some people are talking about the 
same level again, but that’s just not sustainable with the current 
breadth of services...’ (CEO & CFO, E4) 
 
’We made the first couple of years of cuts without really impacting 
significantly on services, people didn’t see a difference […] but it is 
about stopping doing things now, or doing things differently.’ (CEO, 
E3)  
 
Reactive adapters: A2 and I4 
The LGs in this group (A2 and I4) were characterized by high vulnerability and limited 
anticipatory and coping capacities when the crisis hit. However, while the crisis has magnified 
perceived vulnerability, it also appears to have triggered a reorientation path towards a 
strengthening of both capacities (table 5 in the appendix).  
After the crisis, A2 experienced budget deficits for three years due to unstable and undiversified 
revenues sources, high debt financing and strong reliance on grants. I4 seemed to be on the 
brink of default due to high debt financing, past reliance on one-off revenues which, after the 
crisis, fell short, and to the low degree of control on external subsidiaries. 
‘[…] the economic crisis was a massive slump for us. This was also the 
reason why we operated with losses for three years. […] There was a 
drop in grants. And personnel cuts in businesses and also drops in 
municipal taxes. […] This was massive, going into millions.’ (CFO, A2) 
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’The first goal was to reduce significantly high debts, and then securing 
the municipal budget. In 2012 we were talking about financial 
collapse.‘ (CEO, I4) 
 
In A2, the interviewees recognized a virtual absence of anticipatory capacities, and in I4, 
planning of activities and the identification of goals were weak. 
’The economic crisis […] caught us unprepared.‘ (CFO, A2) 
 
After the crisis, both LGs started to invest in building the capacities aimed to address their 
respective vulnerabilities. In particular, A2 perceived the crisis as critical immediately after its 
occurrence, and hence implemented long-term investment planning and scenario analysis, and 
buildt and deployed coping capacities. 
’We reduced subsidies, personnel costs; on the revenue side, we 
searched for possibilities with corrections of fees; those were the first 
measures taken, they can be implemented immediately… […] reduced 
service standards in the area of roads and works, parks, and so on. And 
then we tried to tackle the structural problems and challenges […] we 
did a task review, audited the standards […] we also did a structural 
school reform.’ (CEO, A2) 
 
With some time lag, I4 took a similar approach. In 2011, the extraordinary commissioner 
appointed after the resignation of the mayor increased all taxes, while undertaking 
rationalization. This translated into a strengthening of monitoring tools, investments in new 
models for delivering services, increased networking with external stakeholders, and, thus, an 
overall expansion of anticipatory and coping capacities.  
’They [the department for social services] have changed the way they 
manage services to ensure that the LG becomes a facilitator of 
relations, a point of collection of resources from the territory.’ (CFO, 
I4) 
 
Strengthening their initially low anticipatory and coping capacities, A2 and I4 appear to have 
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embarked upon a path of reactive adaptation. Notwithstanding their challenging institutional 
and economic environment and the impact of shocks (for both a decrease in revenues, with 
lower taxes and grants for A2 and a tightening of fiscal targets and increased regulatory 
uncertainty in I4), the interviewees felt they were in the position to address their vulnerabilities. 
Moreover, they perceived the crisis as the trigger to bring about changes as well as an 
opportunity to (re-)gain control over their financial vulnerabilities.  
 
Contented fatalists: A3 and A4  
The fourth group includes two Austrian LGs (A3, A4) that are wealthy and were not initially 
perceived as particularly vulnerable, mainly thanks to a high, stable and diversified own-
revenue base, but whose perceived vulnerability increased after the crisis (table 6 in the 
appendix).  
’Luckily we have financially strong businesses that pay a lot of taxes.‘ 
(CFO, A4) 
 
’We have many small and medium sized enterprises, and therefore we 
did not have such an impact on the municipal tax […].’ (CFO, A3) 
 
 
Anticipatory capacities in these LGs were initially weak as they were not seen as necessary. In 
A3, investment in anticipatory capacities (e.g. anticipated approval of supplementary budget, 
quarterly information on financial condition) was made after the crisis, however the coping 
capacities deployed (mainly buffering, e.g. cost cuts, deferring investments) did not address 
emerging vulnerabilities, mostly related to an ageing population.  
’The crisis hit us and while we had planned to generate increasing 
revenues, we had to increase the debt level to finance investments. 
When the crisis occurred in 2007/2008, we immediately tried to reduce 
our spending, […] to defer investments or maintenance…’ (CFO, A3) 
 
A similar pattern can be observed in A4, where favorable environmental conditions may have 
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encouraged the LG to downplay emerging vulnerabilities, while not investing in anticipatory 
and coping capacities.  
’...risk monitoring, assessment… this does not exist […] During 
investment projects there is always information that the projected 
budget might not be enough.’ (CEO, A4) 
 
’We are still healthy I would say, but a stronger wind would blow us 
away. […] we do have high debt at this time and we aim to reduce it.’ 
(CFO, A4) 
 
In short, A3 and A4 appear to behave like contented organizations, which, resting on their 
laurels, had not anticipated the crisis, and hope to weather the storm relying on buffering 
capacities. In the long term, however, this may translate into increased vulnerability and the 
need to take stronger actions. The still wealthy conditions and context have so far offset extant 
anticipatory and coping weaknesses.  
 
Powerless fatalists: I2 and I3 
The fifth group includes two Italian LGs (I2 and I3) characterized by initial high vulnerability 
(e.g., high burden of debt repayment and doubtful liabilities2), a sense of powerlessness in the 
face of the crisis and limited anticipatory capacities. Relying mainly on buffering and 
postponing critical issues to the future, they both experienced an increase in their perceived 
vulnerability after the crisis (table 6 in the appendix). Low anticipatory capacities are reflected 
in weak monitoring and planning mechanisms.  
‘[…] information flows often do not occur in real time‘ (CFO, I2) 
 
’We do not have [...] an office for management control‘ (CFO, I3) 
 
                                                          
2 Doubtful liabilities are liabilities of doubtful recovery. 
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Coping with the crisis was dominated by deploying buffering capacities, ranging from cost 
cutting to deferring investments in both LGs, reliance on selling assets (I2), and building of 
financial reserves from a one-off transaction (I3) made in 2008 with a subsidiary company.  
 
’Certainly we think about the capacity to have sources of revenues. […] 
Among the alternatives, there is selling assets […]’ (CEO, I2) 
 
’What determines recent years’ surpluses is a very large surplus, 
around 10 million, established in 2008. It comes from a granting credit 
made to a subsidiary for the purchase of some municipal buildings…’ 
(CFO, I3)  
 
Of particular relevance was the belief of not being able to react to the crisis and the higher 
legislative uncertainty that characterized Italy in its aftermath. The financial crisis and its 
consequences seemingly exceeds the threshold of existing capacities, leading to a perception 
of powerlessness and forcing these LGs to a day-by-day management of emergencies, highly 
reliant on buffering capacities. 
Although the interviewees declared that they were starting to improve their anticipatory 
capacities by increasing monitoring, a short-term perspective prevailed and the increased 
uncertainty appears to translate in a higher level of vulnerability after the crisis.  
’We have tried to live year-to-year, not to say almost day-to- day.’ 
(CFO, I3) 
 
’The General Development Plan represents our attempt to plan 
activities, but it clashes with the reality of the decline of certain annual 
revenues […]. We are often forced to postpone activities. Imminence 
and urgency affect the quality of programming.’ (Service Director, I2) 
 
This suggests a fatalist type of resilience, externally driven, constrained by external pressures 
and limited reliance on internal capacities. This combination supports a vicious circle, whereby 
the limited capacities feed vulnerability and the perception that the latter cannot be controlled 
may, in turn, discourage investment on capacities. 
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Discussion  
This study set out to explore the internal and external dimensions and conditions that shape 
financial resilience in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, identify the different 
resilience patterns they give rise to, and how such dimensions develop and interact in 
anticipation or in reaction to crisis over time. In doing so, it provides a first conceptualization 
and operationalization of governmental financial resilience.  
Looking at the emergent dimensions of resilience, the above analysis adds to previous literature 
by offering a view not only on organizational responses to shocks, but also on the roles of the  
environmental conditions, types and combinations of organizational capacities, and actors’ 
perceptions in shaping how local governments face shocks and crises. More specifically, the 
above analysis provides evidence of the how anticipatory and coping capacities as well as 
perceived financial vulnerability contribute to explain the emerging patterns of financial 
resilience, offering an in-depth operationalization of such capacities and patterns.  
Looking at emerging resilience patterns, the findings presented above show that the interaction 
of these dimensions gave rise to different patterns of financial resilience: self-regulation, 
constrained or reactive adaptation, contented or powerless fatalism. The findings provide a rich 
view of these typologies of LG financial resilience, corroborated by the multiplicity of cases 
and shown in the Appendices to the paper. This adds to existing literature on responses to 
crises, by proposing a novel typology that is not only based on responses, but also on how the 
responses are shaped by existing external conditions and internal dimensions. It also responds 
to recent calls for exploring the diversity of approaches to resilience (Duit, 2016). 
In looking at how the combination and interaction of different resilience dimensions can 
explain emerging resilience patterns, the analysis suggests that a more balanced view is 
necessary to understand such patterns, integrating the literature that emphasizes the importance 
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of environmental conditions in affecting governments’ behaviors (Boyne and Meier 2009; 
Hendrick 2011; Linnenluecke 2015) with the resilience literature looking at internal capacities 
reviewed above.  
Examples of this need were evident in each of the three countries. In England, it seems that the 
institutional environment may have affected LGs anticipatory capacity. There, according to the 
interviewees, the managerial reforms implemented over the last few decades may have fostered 
and institutionalized high anticipatory capacity, thus contributing to equipping the investigated 
LGs to anticipate possible shocks. However, this alone could not explain the different – self-
regulatory and constrained adapters – resilience paths in this country. More specifically, these 
cases show the importance of coping capacities in addressing environmental conditions and 
managing emerging vulnerability over time. In Italy, the re-centralization of decisions, 
constantly changing central regulations on revenues and transfers, as well as difficult economic 
conditions were mentioned as limiting in all cases. However, this resulted in low anticipatory 
capacity and limited coping capacities (mainly buffering) and higher vulnerability in two LGs 
only (powerless fatalists). The other two tried to keep their vulnerability under control either 
by developing, or by keeping their anticipatory capacity high and deploying at least selective 
coping capacities (self-regulatory and adaptive resilience). For Austria, the relatively stable 
policy and regulatory framework together with low monitoring requirements, and the relative 
economic affluence of local economic conditions appeared to be the reason for low anticipatory 
capacity and mainly limited coping capacities (mostly buffering) in two cases (contented 
fatalist resilience). In contrast, the other two show patterns of self-regulatory and adaptive 
resilience that are similar to the respective English and Italian cases mentioned above.  
The analysis also revealed that, while anticipatory, adaptive, and transformative capacities are 
complementary and appear to reinforce each other, reducing perceived financial vulnerability, 
heavy exploitation of buffering capacities may crowd out the development of other capacities 
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needed to bounce forward, resulting in higher levels of vulnerability over time (Davoudi et al. 
2013; Meier and O’Toole 2009; Wildavsky 1988). 
Finally, this study highlights that not only ‘objective’ conditions matter, but also how such 
conditions are identified, understood, and managed (see also Boin et al. 2010; Lengnick-Hall 
and Beck,2005; Linnenluecke and Griffith 2013, Lu and Xue 2016; McManus et. al. 2007; 
Somers 2009; Weick and Suttcliffe 2009). This points to the major role played by the perceived 
sources of vulnerability in explaining patterns of resilience. The LGs’ financial vulnerability 
was discussed as being the result of both external (e.g. dependency on grants, undiversified 
revenues) and internal (e.g. debt financing, reserves) sources influencing the LGs’ exposure to 
financial shocks, and thus turned out to be at the interface between the environment and the 
organization, and central in understanding patterns of financial resilience. The across-case 
analysis revealed that - more than a specific level of vulnerability (Hendrick 2011) - the 
’endogenization‘ of vulnerability (i.e. the sense of being able to influence its sources) or its 
’exogenization‘ (i.e., the sense of being unable to control its sources) affected the way in which 
the financial crisis and the resulting impacts were interpreted, and received attention. At one 
extreme, the sources of financial vulnerability were regarded as at arm’s length and thus 
manageable. This was the case among the self-regulators, where strong and comprehensive 
investment in anticipatory and coping capacities increased the ability to manage or offset the 
impact of environmental conditions. In this case vulnerability was kept under control.  
At the other extreme, the sources of vulnerability were generally attributed to the overall 
environment and scant consideration was given to the development of internal capacities. This 
resulted either in powerless behaviors, where the environment was seen as so uncertain and 
unfavorable that the possibility to keep vulnerability under control was not considered a viable 
option, and only buffering capacities were relied upon; or in contented behaviors, where 
favorable environmental conditions seemingly made it less urgent to invest in anticipatory and 
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coping capacities. Both patterns exerted a passive behavior towards their vulnerability sources 
(i.e. ’exogenization‘ of vulnerability) and an increase in vulnerability was shown. The two 
extremes suggest the existence of respectively a virtuous and a vicious circle. In the middle 
between these extremes, there are those LGs where vulnerability either increased (i.e., cases 
where anticipatory and coping capacities did not target the specific environmental sources of 
vulnerability that emerged after the crisis, such as constrained-adaptive patterns) or decreased 
(i.e., cases where the shock represented an opportunity to invest in capacities to re-gain 
ownership of vulnerability, such as reactive-adaptive patterns). Indeed, it can be expected that 
in regaining ownership of their vulnerability, these LGs may be able to adapt and progress in 
time to positions of self-regulation, or may ultimately find they are constrained in the extent 
to which they can manage sources of disturbance in the environment. This analysis suggests 
that explaining resilience patterns requires taking into account whether LGs endogenize or 
exogenize their sources of vulnerability. 
The above reflection also contributes to explain why it was not always possible to identify a 
direct and straightforward link between resilience patterns and the financial data used to select 
the LGs. The results show that specific combinations of budgetary position and volatility do 
not necessarily lead to specific resilience patterns. This link could only be observed in the self-
regulatory group (A1, E1, I1), where average budgetary position remains consistently around 
zero over the ten-year period. In contrast to other resilience patterns, self-regulatory resilience 
seems to be related to a strong orientation towards maintaining a stable financial position even 
after adjusting for shocks. However, where volatility is higher and the budgetary position is 
different from zero, this link disappears and mere financial data are not sufficient to understand 
emerging patterns of resilience, requiring to take jointly into consideration environmental 
conditions and internal capacities and a central role is played by perceived vulnerability.  
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Conclusion 
The increased uncertainty, volatility and complexity under which LGs operate, coupled with 
significant reductions in public spending, have put great emphasis on how they cope with 
shocks, especially financial ones. This article has explored governmental resilience, i.e. 
governments’ ability to anticipate, absorb and react to shocks affecting their finances over time. 
In doing so, different patterns of financial resilience (i.e. self-regulation, constrained or reactive 
adaptation, contented or powerless fatalism) have been identified, and internal and external 
dimensions that shape these patterns have been traced out. The perspective of resilience proved 
useful in integrating contributions from different streams of literature and to analyse the 
deployment and development of internal capacities of governments in dealing with uncertainty 
related to shocks and disturbances (Davoudi 2012; Linnenlucke and Griffith 2010; Mamouni-
Limnios et al. 2014; Shaw 2012; Sutcliffe and Vogus 2003; Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). This 
approach therefore provides insights of more general and long-term relevance on how LG 
financial resilience is shaped by environmental conditions, organizational dimensions 
(anticipatory and coping capacities), and financial vulnerability that results from and influences 
the interplay of the former two.  
Though the study is placed in the context of a financial crisis and its aftermath, and looks at 
three countries, the variety of cases and countries under analysis allow to highlight and 
operationalize patterns of behaviors that can be seen as being of more general relevance to the 
literature.  
The study provides evidence that environmental conditions, often highlighted in contributions 
on fiscal stress and austerity, are not sufficient per se to explain different resilience patterns 
and to ensure resilience-building processes, which require serious consideration and 
development of organizational (anticipatory and coping) capacities. At the interface between 
environmental conditions and organizational capacities lies perceived financial vulnerability, 
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which is at the same time the consequence of their interaction over time, as well as an important 
explanation of resilience patterns. This study therefore provides support to the view that it may 
be necessary to go beyond country-based characterizations of public sector organizations, 
especially at the local level, and that it is necessary to take a finer-grained view on how the 
environmental and organizational features shape financial resilience.  
The analysis can have relevant implications for practitioners and policy makers alike. From the 
point of view of policy makers, this study highlights the role of centrally-defined policies for 
LGs, in inhibiting or enhancing anticipatory and coping capacities as well as influencing 
perceived financial vulnerability. More specifically, regulators may encourage the creation, or 
even require, mandatory reserves to use as a countercyclical tool, while fostering revenue 
diversification and fiscal autonomy. At the same time, the analysis suggests that public 
managers should not only look at the external environment and nationally imposed policies to 
prepare for or cope with crises and shocks, but also reflect on sources and levels of 
vulnerabilities and thereby understand what anticipatory and coping capacities they need to 
assess, nurture, and develop in order to anticipate, absorb and react to shocks affecting their 
finances over time. While a combination of anticipatory and transformative capacities may be 
required in the face of shocks with significant magnitude, and thus often capacities can be seen 
as complementary and possibly reinforcing each other, in some cases, a favourable 
environment and/or the over-reliance on buffering capacities appeared to crowd-out the 
development of other capacities. 
As any analysis, also this study has limitations, in that it focuses on three countries, twelve 
cases, and the local government level. Also it is based on interviews, which allowed to capture 
the perceptions of interviewees at the time when the analysis was conducted. Further studies, 
including cross-country and cross-government analyses, might test the proposed framework 
and findings using quantitative approaches in order to capture the environmental and 
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organizational dimensions, their interplay with (financial) vulnerability, and resulting patterns 
of governmental financial resilience, or adopt a longitudinal stance by looking at the evolutions 
of patterns of resilience and related dimensions over several years. Aspects that may deserve 
further consideration are the external and internal determinants of endogenization and 
exogenization of vulnerability3, as well as the challenges that decision makers face in 
deploying, while at the same time not exhausting, coping capacities.   
                                                          
3 We owe this idea for further research to one of the reviewers.  
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Figure 1 – Financial Resilience Framework 
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Appendix Table 1 – Country comparison, general indicators 
  Austria Italy UK-England 
Population in mio. 8.47 59.69 63.91 
GDP per capita in Euro 37,000 25,600 29,600 
General debt level as % of GDP 89% 145% 105% 
General fiscal balance as % of 
GDP 
-1% -3% -6% 
Administrative tradition Continental European model Southern European Model Anglo-Saxon Model 
No. of LGs 2,357 8,092 9,000 
No. of seats of district 
authorities/seats of 
province/STCCs 
72 117 152 
Level of decentralization Federal Unitary ("Quasi-federal") Unitary 
LG profiles  North Middle European Group Franco Group Anglo-Group 
Main LG fiscal sources Municipal business tax (payroll 
tax); resident property tax; fees 
and charges 
Municipal property tax; 
household waste tax;  
tax on the occupation of public 
spaces and areas; local 
advertising tax; surtax on 
personal income tax; fees and 
charges; surtax on electricity 
consumption; municipal tax on 
building licences  
 
provincial vehicle insurance tax 
and registration tax; regional tax 
on productive output; regional 
automobile tax; fuel duty 
Council tax (resident property); 
retained and redistributed non-
domestic rates (business rates); 
other government grants 
(including specific government 
grants); sales, fees and charges; 
council rents 
Main LG shared taxes Value added tax; property 
acquisition tax; corporate 
income tax; personal income 
tax; petrol tax 
Personal income tax 
(municipalities and provinces); 
personal income tax and 
corporate income tax (regions 
with special status) 
Business rates (business 
property tax) 
Financial arrangements Centralized collection with re-
distribution agreement of main 
taxes (VAT, income taxes) and 
state caps on LG taxes 
 
 
 
Deficit/surplus targets for 
central and sub-central 
government and sanctioning 
mechanism set in  Stability Pact 
  
Issuance of LG own debt 
allowed only to finance capital 
expenditure, approval required 
depending on state government 
regulation, cap on debt 
depending on the state 
government  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual constraints on 
expenditure and/or the budget 
balance of sub-central 
government set in  
Stability Pact 
 
Issuance of LG own debt 
allowed only to finance capital 
expenditure, no approval by 
upper-level government 
required, cap on debt service 
Central grant distribution 
determined by centrally set 
funding formula, including 
redistribution of business rates 
(amended 2014/15 to include an 
element of business rates 
retained locally 
 
Statutorily required to set a 
balanced budget 
 
 
 
Issuance of LG own debt 
allowed only to finance capital 
expenditure, no approval by 
upper-level government 
required, internally set caps on 
debt 
All figures 2013. Data taken from OECD databases and national statistics offices. Information on financial 
arrangements: European Commission (2012).  
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Appendix Table 2: Financial data across cases 
 Austria England Italy 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 E1 E2 E3 E4 I1 I2 I3 I4 
Revenues Percentage by Type4             
Own-Taxes 20.30% 28.35% 21.68% 21.92% 8.52% 16.38% 21.46% 14.97% 48.93% 46.87% 50.26% 48.81% 
Shared Tax Revenues /Grants 37.39% 36.40% 32.82% 41.81% 74.91% 58.24% 60.81% 66.68% 20.10% 19.29% 21.81% 21.16% 
Fees and Charges and Other Income 42.36% 35.27% 45.58% 36.10% 16.57% 25.38% 17.73% 18.35% 30.97% 33.84% 27.93% 30.03% 
             
Expenditure Percentage by Function5             
General Public Services  16.11% 21.78% 18.41% 11.29% 11.80% 6.39% 6.58% 13.25% 16.87% 22.06% 24.53% 16.10% 
Public Order and Safety (e.g. police, fire) 1.30% 3.19% 2.79% 0.85% - - - - 5.48% 5.36% 5.22% 4.80% 
Education, Recreation, Sports 11.42% 14.06% 11.52% 13.43% 31.12% 39.43% 50.77% 38.30% 45.25% 4.90% 5.50% 5.97% 
Culture, heritage and related services 6.53% 1.67% 3.11% 5.11% 2.60% 3.04% 1.82% 0.16% 0.14% 2.18% 0.95% 0.87% 
Social Services, Housing Services 10.05% 13.02% 11.31% 8.65% 41.37% 40.04% 28.06% 34.87% 27.75% 17.97% 28.44% 30.10% 
Health 4.49% 9.06% 7.27% 10.94% 3.12% 3.02% 3.33% 3.68% - - - - 
Infrastructure (e.g. Roads, Transport) 2.88% 3.66% 5.25% 8.02% 3.21% 3.27% 5.21% 4.89% 2.92% 6.72% 6.95% 7.58% 
Economic Affairs 1.11% 1.15% 1.01% 1.52% - - - - 1.59% 1.88% 0.77% 0.90% 
Municipal services (e.g. sewerage, water) 46.10% 32.42% 39.33% 40.19% 6.77% 4.81% 4.23% 4.85% 19.67% 23.49% 19.93% 20.06% 
             
Financial Ratios6             
Budgetary Position -0.16% -1.11% 0.71% 0.12% -0.01% -1.57% 2.02% 0.01% 0.02% -1.12% 2.70% -0.02% 
Volatility 1.71% 17.30% 10.89% 21.39% 0.81% 3.46% 2.25% 4.47% 0.54% 5.26% 7.57% 5.40% 
Operating Ratio7 17.94% 7.16% 3.61% 13.76% 7.39% 1.69% 4.40% 6.22% -0.13% 10.79% 2.83% -2.28% 
Volatility 6.60% 10.26% 1.87% 3.87% 2.59% 1.65% 1.18% 1.36% 2.33% 1.63% 3.99% 4.79% 
(Net) Operating Ratio8 9.82% -6.36% -2.88% 4.47% 0.54% -0.42% 1.14% 0.44% -3.22% -4.03% -0.80% -10.04% 
Volatility 6.95% 13.14% 7.88% 3.98% 1.18% 1.35% 1.11% 1.13% 2.79% 11.30% 5.56% 6.44% 
Debt Ratio9 72.23% 99.89% 56.80% 113.32% 68.84% 29.73% 36.37% 56.18% 20.60% 130.06% 47.62% 61.14% 
Volatility 8.61% 27.62% 9.30% 28.83% 34.18% 4.77% 4.23% 9.32% 4.04% 7.85% 2.59% 19.84% 
Investment Ratio10 16.60% 27.11% 13.44% 31.58% 18.99% 11.07% 9.34% 16.74% 33.02% 77.10% 30.10% 64.47% 
Volatility 3.82% 14.78% 6.26% 13.57% 4.31% 2.06% 1.16% 6.64% 14.82% 33.60% 8.85% 19.06% 
Sources: England - Revenue Outturn Summary (RS) and Capital Expenditure and Receipts (COR4) datasets 2002/03 to 2011/12, plus Revenue Outturn Service Expenditure 
Summary (RSX) datasets 2006/06 to 2011/12 – Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), United Kingdom 
                                                          
4 Ten year average between 2002 and 2011 for Austria and Italy, 7 year average between 2005/06 and 20011/12 for England due to availability of data 
5 Based on 2013 actuals for Austria and Italy and 2013/14 actuals for England 
6 Ten year averages between 2002 and 2011 for Austria and Italy and 2002/03 and 2011/12 for England 
7 (Total operating revenues - Total operating expenditures)/Total operating revenues 
8 (Total operating revenues - Total operating expenditure - Debt repayment) / Total operating revenues [debt repayment =  Interest paid; in the UK also includes Minimum 
Revenue Provision] 
9 (Outstanding debt/Total Operating revenues) 
10 (Capital Expenditure on assets, grants/loans awarded and equity acquisition)/Operating Income 
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Appendix Table 3: Variable definition and operationalization 
Note: text in [brackets] indicates the themes emerging from interviews 
Variable and 
definition 
Categories and 
definition 
Quotes (Examples) 
Financial 
shock 
Major 
unexpected 
event in the 
external 
environment 
perceived as 
affecting LG 
finances 
Financial 
crisis and 
consequences 
The 
phenomenon 
of a series of 
crises 
experienced in 
2007-2009 and 
their aftermath, 
in literature 
broadly 
referred to as 
the ‘Global 
Financial 
Crisis’ or ‘the 
Great 
Recession’ 
“2009/2010 was then the economic crisis [economic crisis], that has posed a problem.” 
(CFO, A2) 
“The big change was certainly the financial crisis in 2008 [financial crisis].” (CFO, A4) 
“The economic crisis [economic crisis] affects building policies (urban plans do not start).” 
(CEO, I2) 
“Today we have lower revenues from building permits… this is the consequence of the 
economic crisis.” (Staff, Office for the budget, I4) 
“The largest one has been the financial crisis [financial crisis] and there were other ones 
that were a consequence [austerity] of that.” (Service Director, E2)  
“I think it [the financial crisis] was a shock, it was very shocking.” (CEO, E3)  
“We had planned for further reductions but it turned out to be a lot lot worse than….our 
savings target overnight went up [austerity] from £127 to £157 million over a 5 year period 
and that I would say was a shock.” (CFO, E3) 
External 
environment 
The 
institutional, 
economic and 
social 
environment in 
which local 
governments 
operate  
Institutional 
environment  
The system of 
rules, 
regulations, 
policies set by 
upper 
governmental 
levels and 
under which 
local 
governments 
operate 
“We have no control over the bigger part of revenues and expenditures [fiscal 
regulations/autonomy].” (CFO, A3).  
“Every year the law changes [fiscal regulations/uncertainty] - the Stability Pact, transfers.” 
(CFO, I4)  
“We have the most centralized system of resource allocation [fiscal regulations/autonomy] 
to be found anywhere in Europe, so therefore our dependency on the priorities of central 
government…is therefore clearer and more visible than it is elsewhere.” (CEO E1)  
“Most people will see the headlines that local authorities are allowed to keep 50 % of business 
rates. We get to keep 27 % [fiscal regulations/autonomy] in E2 because we are deemed to be 
too affluent to start with...” (CFO, E2) 
“We plan in a medium-term perspective, we have to – by law [planning rules]. (CFO, A4) 
“[It] says in a LAAP bulletin (as part of the regulatory environment) you must risk assess 
[monitoring rules], so every year we risk assess and we include it in our 5 year financial 
plan.” (CFO, E3) 
Economic 
environment 
Economic 
conditions of 
the area where 
the local 
government 
operates  
 
 
“Luckily we have financially strong businesses that pay a lot of municipal taxes [strong 
economic base].” (CEO, A4)  
“We have many small and medium sized enterprises [diversified economic base]” (CEO, 
A3) 
 “We are a very successful city generating lots of jobs, lots of growth in economic terms 
[economic growth]” (CFO, E1)  
 “In E3 we were not always positioned well in terms of opportunities for finances [weak 
financing opportunities]…. We have got some very affluent areas and some very deprived 
areas...” (CEO, E3) 
“[E4] is not the most affluent of areas, so in terms of council tax, we don’t have lot in terms 
of council tax yield [weak financing opportunities]….. We don’t have an industry that is 
specific to [E4]…” (CEO & CFO, E4) 
Socio-
demographic 
environment 
Social and 
demographic 
characteristics 
of the LG 
population 
 
“We are rather declining [decreasing population] that hurts us since grants are related to the 
population.” (CEO, A3) 
“There has been a gradual deterioration of the ability of citizens to pay. (...) And also in 
relation to the demand for services (canteens, nurseries) the percentage of unrealized 
revenues is increasing. [increasing deprived population]” (CFO, I4) 
“You know, the population has increased by over 100,000. We have the fastest growth 
[population growth] in the country. That has brought great challenges. We used to be 
known to have an ageing population [ageing population], now there is an absolute 
explosion of young people [influx of younger people] coming to live in the city.” (CEO, 
E1) 
“We’ve got more people with disabilities [high level of disabilities] living longer, we’ve 
got an ageing population and demographic changes [ageing population], E4 is going as fast 
as anywhere in the UK. We’ve got no taxes to pay for these services...” (Service Director, 
E4) 
Perceived 
Vulnerability  
 “We have many small and medium sized enterprises, and therefore we did not have such an 
impact on the municipal tax [strong and diversified tax revenues] the crisis hit us, we had to 
increase the debt level [high debt financing] to finance our investments.” (CFO, A3)…the 
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Perceived 
exposure to 
financial 
shocks and 
disturbances  
 
grants, here we have the problem that the population has been stagnating [stagnation of 
grants] within the last years.” (CFO, A3) low, increasing perceived vulnerability 
 “We operated with losses [budget deficits] for three years. […] It was a drop in grants, 
drops in municipal taxes [undiversified and unstable revenue sources]. […] This was 
massive, going into millions. [However] we were able to increase the municipal tax 
revenues within the last years. [decreased dependence on undiversified revenues] We are 
reducing the debt level [decreasing debt] especially the burden of loans.” (CEO, A2) high, 
decreasing perceived vulnerability 
“We […] are one of the Italian Municipalities with the lowest level of debt.[low debt 
financing]” (CFO, I1) low perceived vulnerability 
“From 2005 to 2011...the story is very different: they [referring to managers] continued to 
make investments and to finance them, they made borrowing […] It was 2009, when we 
registered 57 million of debt [high debt financing]. We have a particularly wide network of 
subsidiaries [reliance on but low control of subsidiaries], about 40 companies, municipal 
public companies, some of them are also shared with private businesses, and when I arrived 
in 2012, all the companies were basically insolvent and defaulted [danger of default] we 
were talking about a financial collapse [danger of default] of the Municipality.” (CEO, I4) 
high perceived vulnerability 
“By having that diversified economic base [diversified economic base] our dependency on 
particular sectoral difficulties and crashes was much lower. If you look at our balance sheet 
you will see that it is extremely healthy in terms of sitting on reserves [healthy financial 
reserves] and cash levels and the overall debts are down very considerably [low debt 
financing]. We cannot change the economic cycles. What we can do is to reduce our 
dependency and promote maximum independence [self-sufficiency] to be able to ride and 
overcome those economic cycles. E1 has done this and continues to do that.” (CEO, E1) 
low, stable perceived vulnerability 
“E4 was always well run, we always had plenty of reserves [healthy financial reserves] and 
were well financed. We kind of continued that.” (CFO, E4) “We are under borrowed [low 
debt financing], so we’ve got cash. […] In terms of our overall financial health I think we 
are still healthy […] a lot of risk has been transferred to local authorities [risk transferred 
from central government] with for my view not a great amount of reward. There is a target 
on the department [to] save £ 250,000, so we are talking 32 times the scale [of] the 
challenge and people were saying it can’t be done because of the rise in demand in the 
population. (Service Director, E4) “If it goes on, what can we deliver in 2016? […] no one 
knows how the financial outlook is going to be after that [uncertainty regarding near 
future]. Some people are talking about the same level [of savings] again, but that’s just not 
sustainable with the current breadth [misfit between funding and service responsibilities] of 
services the local authorities have to deal with...I don’t think we can do what we have done 
again.” (CFO, E4) low, increasing perceived vulnerability 
Anticipatory 
Capacities 
The ability to 
identify and 
manage LG 
vulnerabilities, 
to recognize 
(potential) 
shocks in an 
early stage, 
and to 
understand 
their impact on 
the LG  
Tools that are 
used to 
monitor the 
environment 
and help to 
identify and 
manage LG 
vulnerabilities. 
The tools can 
exist or be 
built up 
internally-
driven, or 
externally-
driven, e.g. 
instruments 
required by 
upper 
governmental 
levels LG 
actors’ mental 
processes of 
knowing, 
including 
awareness, 
perception, 
reasoning and 
judgment. The 
cognitive 
anticipatory 
“We still managed to master this [crisis] well […] this is also due to a conscious financial 
management. It is the administration’s responsibility to warn in time. […] I mean, the 
signals were there…[cautious planning, monitoring and control processes]” (CEO, A1) 
high anticipatory capacity 
“The economic crisis […] it caught us unprepared because we did not recognize its 
dimension. [low environmental (trends) and self-awareness]” (CFO, A2) low anticipatory 
capacity 
“Well, I have to say that political actors now are aware [increasing awareness] that you 
have to maintain the balance, one can observe this. [weak medium-term financial 
planning][…] The quarterly reports are a monitoring tool [enhanced financial monitoring]” 
(CFO, A3) increasing anticipatory capacity 
“Let’s say that they [managers] know [the financial constraints], but they often simply 
ignore it. [weak awareness]” (CFO, I3) low anticipatory capacity 
“The antidote to such a changing, uncertain and unpredictable situation is to use prudence 
and gradualness in the assumption of expenditure obligations. [strong planning]” (CFO, I1) 
“We try to make good predictions, […] through careful monitoring [monitoring and control 
processes, simulation]. The budget is not written once but is constantly reviewed during the 
year. [monitoring and control processes, re-budgeting]” (CEO, I1) high anticipatory 
capacity 
“We implemented a new management system, […] thus we are able to schedule the 
activities at the beginning of each year and to monitor the results, even in terms of 
management control. [enhanced planning and monitoring]” (CEO, I4) increasing 
anticipatory capacity 
“No, we didn’t invest in Icelandic Banks we saw the writing on the wall months before, 
there were enough rumours out there, emails, 7 to 6 months before. We have never had any 
long-term deposits in Iceland Banks so we have never had any treasury risks like that. Most 
people hadn’t anticipated but we had. We have also put £10 million aside 14/15 for any 
residual on […] the appeals side. [high environmental awareness]” (CFO, E1) high 
anticipatory capacity 
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capacities are 
enhanced by 
the existence 
and quality of 
technical 
anticipatory 
capacities. 
 “In terms of risks itself I think it is very important that you have a very realistic and very 
focused risk management system [risk assessment, risk management] what’s the top 20 
risks the organization faces…we regularly look at those risks, revise the lists and you 
update them. [risk assessment, risk management]” (CEO, E2) high, stable anticipatory 
capacity 
“I think we have a financial plan that is honest, [medium-term financial planning] […] we 
have a strong corporate management team where there is a huge amount of honesty and 
challenge. We have a corporate risk approach, so a corporate risk manager […] a corporate 
risk register. [risk assessment, risk management]” (CEO, E3) “Every department produces 
their own risk register which identifies the key issues […] we identify with them [audit 
committee] what the risk is, what our mitigation is, and what our attempt is to get the score 
down to a reasonable level. [risk assessment, risk management]” (CFO, E3) high, stable 
anticipatory capacity 
Coping 
capacities 
The ability to 
deal with the 
impact of 
shocks and 
disturbances. 
These 
capacities lie 
dormant in 
times of order 
and become 
visible in times 
of disruption 
(shock) 
through coping 
actions.  
Buffering 
capacities 
The ability to 
absorb the 
impact of a 
shock without 
changes in its 
structure or 
function  
 
 
“When the crisis came in 2007/2008, we have immediately tried to reduce our spending 
[cost cuts], […] to defer investments or maintenance [defer investment, defer 
expenditures].” (CFO, A3) 
“There were internal discussions, how we can cope with the crisis from a budgetary 
perspective, where we can cut spending. Revenues were not problematic, it was all about 
savings, lower expenditures [cost cuts].” (CFO, A4) 
We have somewhere in the region of £7 million of completely unallocated strategic reserve, 
that’s real rainy day money [financial reserves]. We have quite a lot in various ear marked 
reserves […] We have another reserve […] and we have used it to put money in and out as 
a smoothing mechanism [financial reserves] across years…so we didn’t have to take big 
hits.” (CFO, E2)  
“We […] tried to contain costs [cost cuts] by reducing what we thought can be decreased. 
[…] We were able to avoid investing [deferring investments] in things that are not strictly 
necessary.” (CFO, I3) 
“In 2011 the Municipality was put under receivership [...] when the commissioner came, he 
first increased the rates of all taxes [increasing taxes] in order to reach budget balance.” 
(CFO, I4) 
“We have reserves, which allows us to absorb some of the shocks [financial reserves] if 
some of the savings don’t come along quite as early as we would like. […] yes, we have 
made big cuts [cost cuts] in adult care but a lot of it is because we now charge [increasing 
charges] for which we hadn’t done previously.” (CFO, E3) 
 Adapting 
capacities 
The ability to 
implement 
incremental 
changes to 
extant 
structures and 
functions 
without 
changing 
underlying 
principles, 
culture, values.  
 
 
“We focused very much on attracting businesses, despite the economic crisis, and we also 
succeeded in attracting some employers. [proactive activities in attracting businesses] […] 
This has helped much in municipal taxes, and thereby we have counteracted the negative 
development.” (CEO, A2) 
“We have greatly increased our cooperation with the job center [increasing networking with 
external stakeholders] (Service Director, I1) 
“Several re-organizations have occurred […] reduction of organizational positions […] 
reduction of allowances for managers.” (CEO, I4) 
 “What we are trying to do is move our budget setting process to being more outcome based 
[enhancing performance management], and trying to refocus the money left on our most 
vulnerable within the town, on the services we have to provide for those who can’t provide 
for themselves.” (CFO, E2) 
“The vast majority of reductions made are not made by reducing [services] over the years. 
The majority have been made because we do things better, we cut out the waste. 
[efficiencies]” (CFO, E3) 
“So we have looked at the way we do services so we should get better value from that. 
[efficiencies] […] we have […] a lot more contracting out [partnerships], not necessarily in 
terms of competitive tendering, we have leisure trusts and things like that to bring in some 
commercial expertise. […] we have had a systematic review of [children’s care service]. 
[task review]” (CEO, E1)  
“We have spun out 2 community interest companies, leisure and libraries in the first and in 
the other we’ve got our cultural offer, all of our museums. They have a management 
agreement with us and we give them a fee every year, they are now delivering in 
partnership [partnerships] with the council […] what the council probably would not have 
been able to continue to provide directly.” (CEO, E2) 
 Transforming 
capacities 
The ability to 
implement 
radical 
changes, 
characterized 
by new ‘rules 
of the game’, 
i.e. changes in 
the structure, 
function, goals 
and values of 
the LG  
“When planning investments, we are looking for EU funding possibilities so that we do not 
have to beg the state for funding. So we are relatively independent and flexible. [financial 
self-sufficiency]” (CEO, A1) 
“The ultimate goal, […] a self-sustaining f nancial base. [financial s lf-sufficie cy]” (CEO, 
E1) 
“Our approach is to innovate, look to see what income we can raise from other means.” 
(CEO, E2) “The modelling we have done shows that probably within the next 4 years, 
maybe longer, we are almost going to be self-suffici nt and won’t have any government 
funding left. [financial self-sufficiency] I would say our goals have kind have turned 
around t at we are try ng to make sure we are generating income and that e are self-
sufficient and we can do what we want and carry on providing important services without 
any requirement of government funding has on us. [financial self-sufficiency]” (CFO, E2)  
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Appendix Table 4: Pattern 1 - Self-regulatory resilience.  
 
  A1 E1 E2 I1 
Budgetary position  Zero Zero Negative Zero 
Volatility  Low Low High Low 
Context 
Institutional 
Obligatory but non-binding  
medium term financial 
planning  
Institutional 
Centralized system of 
resource allocation, limits 
on local tax increases 
(referendum) 
Institutional 
Centralized system of 
resource allocation, limits 
on local tax increases 
(referendum) 
Institutional 
Financial dependence of 
LGs on central decisions 
and grants 
Economic 
Strong and diversified 
economic base, poor region 
Economic 
Strong and diversified 
economic base, economic 
growth  
Economic 
New Town status eases 
planning and development 
processes, wealthy 
economic region 
Economic 
Wealthy economic region, 
housing bubble since the 
beginning of the Millennium 
Socio–demographic 
Population stagnation, 
shrinking region 
Socio-demographic 
Population growth, ageing 
population, influx of 
younger people, 
unemployment 
Socio-demographic 
Population growth 
Socio-demographic 
--- 
Financial shocks 
Financial crisis, grant 
reduction  
Grant reduction, reduced 
business rates income due to 
appeals (unfunded) 
Financial crisis, grant 
reduction to negligible 
levels, low business rates 
retention due to affluence 
and reduced business rates 
income due to appeals 
(unfunded) 
Grant reduction, increased 
demand for services, 
tightening of fiscal targets, 
re-centralization of 
decisions and financial 
controls, regulatory 
uncertainty 
Perceived 
vulnerability levels 
and sources before 
the shock and their 
/evolution over time 
* 
 
Initially low 
stable over time 
Low debt financing, healthy 
financial reserves,  
/alternative income sources 
Initially low 
stable over time 
Low debt financing, 
alternative income sources, 
healthy financial reserves 
 
Initially medium 
decreasing over time 
Low financial reserves, 
dependency on central 
grants  
/alternative income sources 
(tax), decreasing 
dependence on central 
grants, increasing financial 
reserves 
 
Initially low 
stable over time 
Low debt financing, high 
level of revenue recovery 
Level and types of 
anticipatory capacity 
before the shock and 
their /evolution over 
time ** 
Initially high 
stable over time 
Embedded medium-term 
financial planning, cautious 
planning, monitoring and 
control processes 
Initially high 
stable over time 
Medium-term financial 
planning, risk assessment 
and other monitoring tools, 
environmental and self-
awareness 
Initially high 
stable over time 
Medium-term financial 
planning, risk assessment 
and other monitoring tools  
 
Initially high 
stable over time 
Risk assessment, strong 
planning, monitoring and 
control processes (e.g., 
simulations, re-budgeting) 
Levels ad types of 
coping capacity*** 
Comprehensive Comprehensive Comprehensive Comprehensive 
 
Buffering: 
Financial reserves, cost cuts, 
deferring investments 
Buffering: 
Financial reserves, cost cuts, 
increasing fees and charges, 
virements, prioritization 
Buffering: 
Financial reserves, cost cuts, 
increasing fees and charges, 
virements 
Buffering: 
Cost cuts, increasing fees 
and charges, prioritization, 
deferring investments 
 
Adapting: 
Enhancing internal 
competencies, restructuring 
and collegiate planning, 
partnerships with private 
developers 
Adapting: 
Invest to save, efficiencies, 
risk management and 
performance management, 
collegiate planning, task 
review, partnerships 
Adapting: 
Invest to save, enhancing 
performance management, 
partnerships with private 
developers, collegiate 
planning 
Adapting: 
Increasing control of 
subsidiaries, rationalization, 
increasing networking with 
external stakeholders 
 
Transforming:  
Financial self-sufficiency 
(alternative income sources)  
Transforming: 
Autonomy and financial 
self-sufficiency 
Transforming: 
Financial self-sufficiency 
Transforming: 
--- 
* This row contains information on the initial levels/ the changes in vulnerability over time, the initial vulnerability sources before the financial shock 
/ their evolution over time. 
** This row contains information on the initial level /the changes in anticipatory capacity over time, the initial types of anticipatory capacities before 
the financial shock /their evolution over time. 
*** Level of coping capacity: limited – the few coping actions and main focus on buffering indicate limited coping capacities; selective – several 
coping actions of buffering and adapting indicate selective coping capacities; comprehensive – the full use of the spectrum of coping actions in 
buffering, adapting and transforming, indicate comprehensive coping capacities.  
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Appendix Table 5: Pattern 2 and 3- Constrained and reactive adaptation.  
 
E3 (ConstrainedAdapters) E4 (Constrained Adapters) A2 (Reactive adapters) I4 (Reactive  Adapters) 
Budgetary position  Positive Zero Negative Zero 
Volatility  High High High High 
Context 
 
Institutional 
Centralized system of 
resource allocation, limits 
on local tax increases 
(referendum), dependence of 
LGs on central government 
transfers and grants 
Institutional 
Centralized system of 
resource allocation, limits 
on local tax increases 
(referendum), dependence of 
LGs on central government 
transfers and grants 
Institutional 
No control over large share 
of revenues (grants) and 
expenditures (transfer 
payments), low LG 
autonomy, strict oversight 
regulations (limits on loans) 
Institutional 
Dependence of LGs on 
central decisions and grants 
Economic 
Weak financing 
opportunities due to 
geographical position 
Economic 
Weak financing 
opportunities due to the lack 
of industries at the local 
level 
Economic 
Industry-dependent, big 
employers 
Economic 
Housing bubble since the 
beginning of the Millennium 
Socio-demographic 
Ageing population, high 
level of disabilities and 
complex needs 
Socio-demographic 
Ageing population, high 
level of disabilities 
Socio-demographic 
--- 
Socio-demographic 
Increasing deprived 
population  
Financial shocks 
Financial crisis, grant 
reduction, increased demand 
for services 
Grant reduction, equal status 
scheme, risk transferred 
from central government 
due to  new council tax 
benefit scheme and business 
rates retention appeals (both 
unfunded)  
Financial crisis, grant 
reduction and tax decrease 
Grant reduction, decreasing 
revenues from building 
permits, , tightening of fiscal 
targets, re-centralization of 
decisions, regulatory 
uncertainty 
Perceived 
vulnerability levels 
and sources before 
the shock and their 
/evolution over time 
* 
 
Initially low 
Increasing over time 
Healthy financial reserves  
/dependence on grants, 
uncertainty regarding near 
future, misfit between 
funding and service 
responsibilities  
Initially low 
Increasing over time 
Low debt financing, healthy 
financial reserves 
/dependence on grants, 
uncertainty regarding near 
future, misfit between 
funding and service 
responsibilities 
Initially high 
decreasing over time 
Undiversified and unstable 
revenue sources, 
dependence on grants, high 
debt financing, budget 
deficits 
/decreased dependence on 
undiversified revenue 
sources, decreasing debt, 
budget stable 
Initially high 
Decreasing over time 
High debt financing, 
reliance on but low control 
of subsidiaries (liabilities), 
one-off revenues, danger of 
default,  
/decreasing number of 
subsidiaries, decreasing debt 
and borrowing  
Level and types of 
anticipatory capacity 
before the shock and 
their /evolution over 
time ** 
Initially high 
stable over time 
Medium-term financial 
planning, risk assessment 
and other monitoring tools 
Initially high 
stable over time 
Medium-term financial 
planning, risk assessment 
and other monitoring tools, 
high environmental 
awareness 
Initially low 
Increasing over time 
Weak medium term 
financial planning, low 
environmental (trends) and 
self-awareness 
/long-term investment 
planning, scenario analysis, 
increasing self-awareness  
Initially low 
Increasing over time 
Weak planning, weak 
monitoring and control 
/enhanced planning and 
monitoring of expenditures 
Levels ad types of 
coping capacity*** 
Selective Selective Selective Selective 
Buffering: 
Financial reserves, cost cuts, 
increasing fees and charges, 
virement, prioritization 
Buffering: 
Financial reserves, cost cuts, 
virement, prioritization, 
over-programming (for 
flexibility) 
Buffering:  
Cost cuts, increasing fees 
and charges, deferring 
investments and 
maintenance, selling assets 
(after needs assessment)  
Buffering: 
Cost cuts, increasing taxes, 
deferring investments, 
prioritization 
Adapting:  
Risk management, 
efficiencies, multi-agency 
working, re-structuring 
services, collegiate planning  
Adapting:  
Invest to save, risk 
management and 
performance management, 
re-balancing the budget, 
partnerships, collegiate 
planning 
Adapting:  
Task review, restructuring 
services (mergers), 
intercommunal urban 
planning, proactive activities 
in attracting businesses 
Adapting: 
Networking with external 
stakeholders for service 
provision, re-organizations, 
re-targeting service users, 
task review, brake on debt 
 Transforming: 
--- 
Transforming: 
--- 
Transforming:  
--- 
Transforming: 
--- 
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Appendix Table 6: Pattern 4 and 5 – Contended and powerless fatalism.  
 A3 (Contended Fatalist) A4 (Contended Fatalist) I2 (Powerless Fatalist) I3 (Powerless Fatalist) 
Budgetary position  Positive Zero Negative Positive 
Volatility  High High High High 
Context 
Institutional 
Dependence of LGs on 
central government transfers 
and grants 
Institutional 
Obligatory but non-binding 
medium-term financial 
planning 
Institutional 
Financial dependence of 
LGs on central decisions 
and grants 
Institutional 
Financial dependence of 
LGs on central decisions and 
grants 
Economic 
Strong and diversified 
economic base, landlocked 
Economic 
Strong and diversified 
economic base 
Economic 
Housing bubble since the 
beginning of the Millennium 
Economic 
Housing bubble since the 
beginning of the Millennium 
Socio-demographic 
Decreasing population 
Socio-demographic 
Population growth 
Socio-demographic 
--- 
Socio-demographic 
--- 
Financial shocks 
Financial crisis, delayed 
grant reduction 
Financial crisis, grant 
reduction 
Grant reduction, decreasing 
revenues from building 
permits, increasing demand 
for services, tightening of 
fiscal targets, re-
centralization of decisions 
and financial controls 
Grant reduction, increasing 
demand for services, 
tightening of fiscal targets, 
re-centralization of decisions 
and financial controls 
Perceived 
vulnerability levels 
and sources before 
the shock and their 
/evolution over time 
* 
 
Low/increasing 
strong and diversified tax 
revenues, assets as reserves 
/high debt financing, foreign 
currency loans, stagnation of 
grants, weak networking and 
partnerships with other LGs  
Low/increasing 
growing, strong and 
diversified tax revenues, 
high debt financing 
/no financial reserves, 
unprepared for further 
shocks 
High 
/increasing 
High debt financing, 
reliance on but low control 
of subsidiaries (liabilities), 
doubtful liabilities, high 
dependence on 
intergovernmental grants  
/unstable revenue sources 
High 
/increasing 
Slow revenues recovery, 
weak managerial 
responsiveness on financial 
constraints 
/unstable revenue sources 
Level and types of 
anticipatory capacity 
before the shock and 
their /evolution over 
time ** 
Low/ 
increasing 
Weak medium-term 
financial planning 
/anticipated approval of 
supplementary budget, 
enhanced financial 
monitoring 
Low 
/increasing 
Weak medium-term 
financial planning, constant 
use of re-budgeting, implicit 
and informal planning  
/”Crisis management team“ 
of political and 
administrative actors 
Low/ 
increasing 
Weak planning, and 
monitoring processes, 
limited information 
exchange 
/monitoring of revenues 
collection 
Low/ 
increasing 
Weak planning and 
monitoring processes, low 
awareness 
/monitoring of revenues 
collection and of balanced 
budget 
Levels ad types of 
coping capacity*** 
Limited Limited Limited Limited 
 
Buffering:  
Cost cuts, increase in fees 
and charges, deferring 
investments and 
expenditures, increase in 
debt (loans) 
Buffering: 
Moratorium on debt 
repayment, cost cuts, 
deferring investments, 
centralization of purchasing 
Buffering: 
Selling assets, cancellation 
of doubtful liabilities 
Buffering: 
Financial reserves (one-off 
transactions with the 
subsidiary company), cost 
cuts, deferring investments, 
prioritization of expenditures 
 
Adapting: 
Urban planning 
Adapting: 
--- 
Adapting: 
--- 
Adapting: 
--- 
 
Transforming: 
--- 
Transforming: 
--- 
Transforming: 
--- 
Transforming: 
--- 
 
